Sexual jealousy is a basic emotion.
Psychological Topics 22 (2013), 2, 155-182
Original scientific paper – UDC – 159.942.6
David M. Buss, Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, USA. E-mail: dbuss@austin.utexas.edu.
The author thanks Laith Al-Shawaf, Kelly Asao, April Bleske, Jaime Cloud, Barry Kuhle, Brad Sagarin, Todd Shackelford, Achim Schutzwohl, and Donald Symons for thoughtful suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.
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Sexual Jealousy
David M. Buss Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, USA
Abstract
Sexual jealousy is a basic emotion. Although it lacks a distinctive facial expression and is unlikely to solve problems of survival, it evolved because it solves adaptive problems of mating. Some adaptive functions are similar in men and women at one level of abstraction, such as warding off potential mate poachers and deterring relationship defection. Other functions are sex- differentiated, such as increasing paternity probability for men and monopolizing a mate’s economic commitments for women. Dozens of studies have documented sex-differentiated design features of jealousy: The relative upset about sexual and emotional aspects of infidelity; processing speed and memorial recall of sexual and emotional infidelity cues; physiological distress to sexual and emotional infidelity cues; qualities of same-sex rivals that evoke jealousy, such as superior job prospects versus greater physical attractiveness; triggers of mate retention tactics; jealous interrogations following the discovery of infidelity; and whether an infidelity produces forgiveness or breakup. Although showing all the hallmarks of evolved functionality, sexual jealousy also leads to tremendous destruction, from humiliation to homicide. By these scientific theoretical and empirical criteria, sexual jealousy is properly considered not only “basic” but also “one of the most important emotions” Keywords: jealousy, infidelity, emotion, evolution, mate retention
Introduction
Jealousy is usually defined as a complex emotional state activated when there is a threat to a valued social relationship (Daly, Wilson, & Weghorst, 1982). When the valued relationship is a close friendship, threats may come from friendship competitors who threaten to usurp a privileged position as a ‘best friend’ or BFF (best friend forever). When the valued relationship is a sexual mateship, threats may come from ‘mate poachers’ who show a keen interest in one’s mate; from the mate who gives off cues to infidelity or relationship defection; or even from the
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relationship itself, as occurs when there is a mate value discrepancy, which might correlate with a threat hovering on the horizon of a relationship, even without an imminent threat of infidelity or defection (Buss, 2000).
Jealousy and envy are often used interchangeably in everyday life, but psychologists usually distinguish the two emotions. Envy is a complex emotion activated when someone else has something that you desire or covet but currently lack. You might envy a work colleague who has secured a better pay raise or promotion or you might envy a mating rival who is more attractive or well-liked. John might be envious of a neighbor who is married to an especially attractive or interesting woman. But John experiences jealousy if that neighbor shows behavior designed to tempt his own wife into a sexual liaison. Jealousy and envy, in short, are distinct emotions, despite their interchangeable usage in everyday discourse.
From an evolutionary perspective, jealousy and envy have distinctly different functions that render them separate emotional adaptations. Envy has been hypothesized to motivate actions designed to obtain the coveted benefits someone else has that one lacks, and also to undermine or derogate rivals who seem to possess benefits that one lacks (DelPriore, Hill, & Buss, 2012). Jealousy, in contrast, has been hypothesized to function to motivate behavior designed to ward off threats to valued relationships with behavior ranging from vigilance to violence (Buss, 1988a; Buss & Shackelford, 1997).
If two emotions have different evolved functions with correspondingly distinct ‘design features’, they are considered to be distinct adaptations, even if they share some features and overlap in some affective or cognitive elements (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998). For example, a woman might become enraged at a peer getting a promotion she felt she deserved instead and become enraged at a husband caught in flagrante delicto with their neighbor’s wife – an affective state common to envy and jealousy. But envy and jealousy have distinct social inputs, information processing procedures, and behavioral outputs. The input of a man having an affair provokes rage if the man is her husband, but not if the man is her co-worker. The input of a man getting an undeserved promotion provokes rage if the man is her rival co-worker, but not if the man is her husband. Similarly, the behavioral output of the two emotions are distinct. The woman envious about her co-worker getting a promotion might evaluate the value of that promotion, and consequently redouble her efforts at work, ingratiate herself with her boss, or try to undermine the projects of her co-worker. The woman experiencing jealousy about her husband’s infidelity might engage in other information processing procedures, such as gauging the value of the relationship and the magnitude of the threat. And contingent on those and other information processing procedures, she might engage in different sorts of behaviors, ranging from withdrawing to a retaliatory affair to divorce.
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The key point is that distinct inputs, distinct decision rules, and distinct behavioral outputs are the hallmarks of distinct adaptations. As with most adaptations, distinct emotion adaptations may have some or many common components. The visual system, for example, is used in both food selection (e.g., to select ripe berries) and mate selection adaptations (e.g., to select mates with cues to health). But the fact that adaptations share common components does not imply that they are not functionally distinct adaptations, in this case for solving adaptive problems of food consumption and sexual consummation, respectively. Analogously, envy and jealousy may share some affective components such as rage, but if they also display distinct inputs, cognitive procedures, and behavioral outputs, they are properly treated as functionally distinct adaptations. Is Jealousy a “Basic” Emotion from an Evolutionary Perspective?
The scientific literature on emotions is rife with debates about whether there exist “basic” emotions. Debates also surround the proper criteria for evaluating whether an emotion is basic or not. The most prominent proponent of the existence of basic emotions is Paul Ekman, who hypothesizes the existence of six or seven: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise are the most agreed-upon six, with contempt being a seventh candidate around which there is some empirical evidence, but less than that of the other six (Ekman, 1973, 1999; Ekman & Cordaro, in press). The central criterion for evaluating an emotion as basic, within Ekman’s theoretical framework, is whether the emotion has a distinctive facial expression that can be recognized universally – an idea originally advanced by Charles Darwin in his book The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin, 1872). Other criteria proposed by Ekman for considering emotions as basic include distinctive universal signals, presence in other primates, distinctive physiology, rapid onset, brief duration, automatic appraisal, and unbidden occurrence (Ekman, 1994). Jealousy does not appear on Ekman’s list of basic emotions, and indeed no theorists have proposed that jealousy has a distinctive and universally recognized facial expression. Nor does jealousy always have a rapid onset. Nor is jealousy’s duration always brief. Rather than being considered “basic,” jealousy within Ekman’s framework may be considered “derived” or a “blend” of different emotions such as anger, fear, and sadness (Ekman, personal communication).
The second key proponent of basic emotions from a somewhat different evolutionary framework is that of Robert Plutchik, who proposes eight primary emotions – anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, anticipation, trust, and joy (Plutchik, 1980). Plutchik’s criteria for basic emotions include: (1) present in non- human animals, (2) universally present across cultures in humans, and (3)
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functional in helping organisms solve adaptive problems of survival. As with Ekman’s framework, jealousy does not make Plutchik’s list of basic or primary emotions.
Although the frameworks of Ekman and Plutchik are both “evolutionary,” from the perspective of modern evolutionary psychology the central criteria for considering an emotion as “basic” or “primary” require re-evaluation. Specifically, considering an emotion or any other psychological mechanisms as basic requires the answer to one key question: Did the emotion evolve, shaped by selection, because it solved an adaptive problem – that is served a specific function – tributary to reproductive success?
This criterion for considering…
