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MILESTONES: 1961–1968
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“Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations” has been retired and is no longer maintained.
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The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a direct and dangerous confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was the moment when the two superpowers came
closest to nuclear conflict. The crisis was unique in a number of ways, featuring calculations and
miscalculations as well as direct and secret communications and miscommunications between the two
sides. The dramatic crisis was also characterized by the fact that it was primarily played out at the White
House and the Kremlin level with relatively little input from the respective bureaucracies typically
involved in the foreign policy process.
Aerial view of missile launch site at San Cristobal, Cuba. (John F. Kennedy Library)
After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and
while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles
in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late
summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including
Soviet IL–28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights, and on September 4, 1962, President
Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of o!ensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the
warning, on October 14 a U.S. U–2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range
and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba.
These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the
onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United
States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Sta!—argued for
an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored stern warnings
to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22, he ordered a
naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade,
which assumed a state of war existed; the use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the
United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States.
That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit
o!ensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases
already under construction or completed, and return all o!ensive weapons to the U.S.S.R. The letter was
the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin
throughout the remainder of the crisis.
The President also went on national television that evening to inform the public of the developments in
Cuba, his decision to initiate and enforce a “quarantine,” and the potential global consequences if the
crisis continued to escalate. The tone of the President’s remarks was stern, and the message
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unmistakable and evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any
nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the
Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The
Joint Chiefs of Sta! announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began
implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba.
On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade”
was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed.
Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were
stopped by U.S. naval forces, but they contained no o!ensive weapons and so were allowed to proceed.
Meanwhile, U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing
operational readiness. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2—
meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent. On October 26, Kennedy told his
advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted on giving
the diplomatic channel a little more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate.
That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported
to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could
be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised
not to invade the island. While White House sta! scrambled to assess the validity of this “back channel”
o!er, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message the evening of October 26, which meant it was sent in the
middle of the night Moscow time. It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear
holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier
that day. “If there is no intention,” he said, “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear
war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie
that knot. We are ready for this.”
Although U.S. experts were convinced the message from Khrushchev was authentic, hope for a
resolution was short-lived. The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that
any proposed deal must include the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day a U.S.
U–2 reconnaissance jet was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors prepared for an attack on
Cuba within days as they searched for any remaining diplomatic resolution. It was determined that
Kennedy would ignore the second Khrushchev message and respond to the first one. That night,
Kennedy set forth in his message to the Soviet leader proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles
from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not
attack Cuba.
It was a risky move to ignore the second Khrushchev message. Attorney General Robert Kennedy then
met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and indicated that the
United States was planning to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey anyway, and that it would do so
soon, but this could not be part of any public resolution of the missile crisis. The next morning, October
28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from
Cuba.
The crisis was over but the naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL–28
bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine. U.S. Jupiter
missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1963.
The Cuban missile crisis stands as a singular event during the Cold War and strengthened Kennedy’s
image domestically and internationally. It also may have helped mitigate negative world opinion
regarding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Two other important results of the crisis came in unique
forms. First, despite the flurry of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the
Kremlin—perhaps because of it—Kennedy and Khrushchev, and their advisers, struggled throughout
the crisis to clearly understand each others’ true intentions, while the world hung on the brink of
possible nuclear war. In an e!ort to prevent this from happening again, a direct telephone link between
the White House and the Kremlin was established; it became known as the “Hotline.” Second, having
approached the brink of nuclear conflict, both superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms race
and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
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